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INTRODUCTION
Across multiple spheres of environmental policy, the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA or agency) is presently seeking to re-
place prescriptive regulatory regimes with ones based on tradable
permits.' Tradable-permit regimes allocate limited pollution rights to in-
* Associate Professor, Michigan State University College of Law. Earlier drafts of this
paper benefited from comments offered during presentations at the Program in Law and Public
Affairs at Princeton University, and, more recently, the Tel-Aviv University Workshop on
Environmental Law and the 2007 Joint Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association
and the Research Committee on Sociology of Law. Thanks to Barbara Bean, Jonathan Levine
and Nick Mercuro for their thoughtful comments and edits. Ema Avsharian and Daniel Bock
provided excellent research assistance, and the reference staff at the MSU College of Law lent
invaluable assistance.
I David M. Driesen, Trading and Its Limits, 14 PENN ST. ENvTL. L. REV. 169, 169
(2006) ("These days, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rarely develops any pollu-
tion control program without including some form of environmental trading within it."). See
generally Tom Tietenberg, Tradable Permits in Principle and Practice, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL.
L. REV. 251, 251 (2006) (commenting on the prominence and diversity of tradable permit
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dustrial sources and allow companies to trade in these entitlements. Buy-
ers within such a pollution market may acquire legal rights to emit
pollution in excess of the initial allocation by purchasing these rights
from other companies who are willing to sell them. In exchange, sellers
undertake the obligation to control pollution to a specified degree below
their initial entitlement. 2
The flagship emissions-trading program in the United States is the
cap-and-trade system governing sulfur dioxide (SO 2) and nitrogen oxide
(NO2) emissions from power plants under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments. 3 In March 2005, the agency finalized a rule that ad-
ded mercury from coal-fired power plants to the list of pollutants subject
to the cap-and-trade regime.4 Mercury is a toxic air pollutant that ac-
cumulates in the food chain5 and is linked to a variety of neurological
impairments. 6 Mercury is listed as a hazardous air pollutant (HAP)
under section 112 of the Clean Air Act.7 The EPA's choice to restrict
mercury emissions through the cap-and-trade program reversed the
agency's earlier commitment to subject these emissions to uniform tech-
nology-based standards. 8 Critics of the EPA's new mercury rule have
highlighted the potential for dangerous localized concentrations of mer-
cury in the vicinity of power plants that, in lieu of controlling their emis-
sions, opt to purchase permits under the cap-and-trade regime.9 A
regimes); NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON. & NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. RESEARCH, EPA, MAR-
KET MECHANISMS AND INCENTIVES: APPLICATIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2003), availa-
ble at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/0/6F9B7804FB5058DE85256D5500673C57
(follow "Session I: Water Trading" hyperlink) (reporting on a variety of current and potential
applications of tradable permits regimes within the EPA).
2 EPA, Definition of Tradable Permit, http://iaspub.epa.gov/trs/trs-proc-qry.navigate
term?p termcd=TERMDIS&ptermid=6022 (last visited Nov. 13, 2007).
3 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 106, 104 Stat. 2399,
2584-2626 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (2000)).
4 Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28606 (proposed May 18, 2005) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 60, 72, & 75).
5 EPA's basic information on mercury includes the following statement: "Americans are
exposed to methylmercury primarily by eating contaminated fish. Because the developing
fetus is the most sensitive to the toxic effects of methylmercury, women of childbearing age
are regarded as the population of greatest concern. Children who are exposed to
methylmercury before birth may be at increased risk of poor performance on neurobehavioral
tasks, such as those measuring attention, fine motor function, language skills, visual-spatial
abilities and verbal memory." U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Air Mercury
Rule, http://epa.gov/camrlbasic.htm (last visited Nov, 13, 2007).
6 See id.
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (2006) (listing pollutants to be regulated).
8 See Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush
Administration, Part 11, 34 ENVTL. L. REP 10485, 10488 (detailing the EPA's "about face"
regarding the regulation of mercury under section 112).
9 See Nikhil Swaminathan, Mercury "Hot Spots" Found in North America, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN.COM, Jan. 3, 2007, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articlelD=EA19F960-E7F2-
99DF-32460084B295C9EA.
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coalition of states filed suit in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit in 2005 to overturn the mercury rules. 10 In exposing the distribu-
tive downside of mercury emissions markets, the dispute has cast a pall
on the future of a host of other emissions-trading regimes.
Unlike direct regulatory demands for uniform reductions by all pol-
lution sources, emissions trading allows for varied responses by different
polluters. Working from a specified aggregate pollution control target,
this regime relies on market exchanges to place pollution rights in the
hands of companies that face the highest pollution control costs. Discre-
tion regarding the timing, location, and in some cases extent of mitiga-
tion remains with regulated entities. As long as the total reduction is
achieved, this regime is indifferent to the particular location of cuts or
excess emissions.11 However, it is on account of this very indifference
that some commentators and environmental activists have seriously ques-
tioned the equity of such market-based regimes.12
Central to this critique is the potential contribution of emissions
trading to pollution hotspots. By allowing buyers of emission credits to
acquire the right to pollute in exchange for surplus reductions taken by
sellers elsewhere, pollution markets allow disparate levels of pollution
mitigation by differently situated firms. The likely result is greater levels
of emissions in the vicinity of credit-buying firms compared to a regime
in which all firms are required to control their emissions. The signifi-
cance of the hotspot phenomenon varies with the nature of the relevant
pollution problem. Where the pertinent threat is global-such as green-
house gas emissions-the location at which reductions take place is of
marginal importance. 13 Where emissions are not locally fungible, how-
ever, the potential for pollution hotspots transforms emissions trading
from a win-win situation into something closer to a zero-sum game.1 4
10 New Jersey v. EPA, No. 05-1097 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 29, 2005). The 2005 lawsuit
was put on hold after the EPA agreed to a formal reconsideration of the rules. In June 2006,
the states renewed the lawsuit after the EPA adopted final rules that failed to address their
concerns. Press release, Office of the New York State Attorney General, Coalition of 16
States File Lawsuit Challenging Final EPA Rules That Will Perpetuate Dangerous Mercury
Hot Spots (June 19, 2006), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/jun/
junl9a 06.html.
I I T.H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING 27 (2d ed. 2006).
12 See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Re-
placing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
289, 310 (1998); Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injus-
tice: Los Angeles' Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DuKE ENVL. L. AND POL'Y F.
231, 251-58 (1999); Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environ-
mental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. R~v. 111, 129
(1999).
13 Driesen, supra note 1, at 170-71.
14 On the centrality of assumptions of fungibility within environmental trading markets,
see generally James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environ-
mental Law, 53 STAN. L. REv. 607 (2000).
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This is not to suggest, however, that conventional direct regulation
is likely to eliminate variations in levels of pollution concentrations
across locales. Emission reductions within such uniform regimes are
typically set according to available, or achievable, technological
means. 15 Most often, the result is incremental pollution mitigation, leav-
ing sometimes significant residual emissions uncontrolled. 16 This
residual pollution is capable of producing significant local impacts, espe-
cially in areas where multiple industrial sources exist in close proxim-
ity 17 The difference between the two methods is that under technology
standards, the hotspot is an artifact of feasible pollution control technol-
ogy or locational clustering, while under emissions trading, varying
levels of air quality are hardwired into the design of the regulatory instru-
ment. Locally uncontrolled air pollution at a given location is a plausible
outcome under emissions trading, in contrast to uniform standards,
where, by definition, some control is required everywhere.
Ultimately, it is over the ideal of feasible mitigation across all
sources of pollution that the direct regulation and emissions-trading ap-
proaches fundamentally diverge. Under the former approach, sometimes
termed command and control, unvarying compliance is expected irre-
spective of the facility's location or pollution control costs relative to
those of similar pollution sources elsewhere. 18 The very quality that di-
rect regulation construes as a virtue-across-the-board implementation
of state-of-the-art controls-is targeted by market-based instruments as
an inefficient rule in need of relaxation.
Awareness of the "hotspot problem" is evident in the literature on
emissions trading since its inception in the 1960s. 19 But attention to the
issue increased during the 1990s, together with the emergence of height-
ened environmental justice concerns. 20 One mode of response to this
15 See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1334-35 (1985); Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 28 (1993).
16 For a critique of the propensity of technology standards to allow for toxic hotspots, see
Brennan, supra note 15, at 35. For an argument equating the potential of both emissions
trading and Best Available Technology Regimes to create pollution "hotspots," see Ackerman
& Stewart, supra note 15, at 1350-51.
17 See Brennan, supra note 15, at 35.
18 Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 275, 275
(2000) ("Command-and-control regulation refers to a system of pollution control based on
uniform standards of performance for sources of pollution. Most typically, regulators adopt
standards that specify for a particular category of sources how much of a given pollutant a
source is permitted to emit over a given unit of time.").
19 See discussion infra Part V.
20 The environmental justice movement called attention to the correlation between low
socio-demographic status and increased exposure to various forms of environmental risk. See
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAzARDous WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRE-
LATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 1-2 (1983);
COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, Toxic WASTES AND RACE IN THE
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critique proposed a layer of spatial limitations and/or monitoring and pre-
approval requirements as means of alleviating attendant distributional in-
equities. 2' Technology and ingenuity may one day provide means of
mitigating some of the distributive impacts of pollution markets, but the
significant complications that any such adjustments entail are liable to
undercut the efficiency gains that pollution markets offer in the first
place. Steps to mitigate pollution markets' distributional impacts will
need to limit the geographic range over which trades of pollutants with
local impact are permissible, moving these interventions in the direction
of uniform regulation. But such steps will reintroduce the ostensible in-
efficiencies of uniformity, which were the reason behind the growth in
market-based alternatives in the first place.22
This article argues that in offering an alternative to uniform regula-
tory controls, pollution markets align with a defining feature of common
law responses to pollution under private and public nuisance doctrines.
Historically, the conditions constituting a legally actionable nuisance va-
ried with the socio-demographic characteristics of affected communi-
ties. 2 3 Poor air quality in the vicinity of industrial sources did not
necessarily merit regulatory intervention. Rather, plaintiffs' right to a
remedy hinged on prevailing land uses and the value of the property in
the areas that the pollution impacted. Within this framework, pollution
hotspots were an inevitable, and ultimately acceptable, consequence of
air pollution regulation under nuisance law. Notwithstanding this sys-
temic preference for varying levels of pollution control, judges needed to
justify their refusal to intervene in the face of evident pollution in indus-
trial locales. Frequently cited in this connection is the plaintiffs' failure
to prove that the pollution was injurious to health. Absent such proof,
the harm associated with pollution assumed an aesthetic, almost trivial,
UNITED STATES 15-23 (1987). Greater awareness of environmental justice concerns led, in
turn, to increased emphasis in the literature of the 1990s on the potential of pollution markets
to exacerbate localized pollution concentrations in poor and minority communities. See U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES
21-25 (1992).
21 See Richard B. Stewart, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AS A NATIONAL GOOD in a Federal
State, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 199, 222 (noting that "[t]he 'hot spot' issue can be addressed...
by framing the trading entitlement in terns of ambient impacts or other measures of environ-
mental degradation rather than emissions"). Some commentators have proposed a system
under which "a prospective buyer and seller would have to receive approval before they could
consummate their trade. This approval could be accomplished with a database, accessed
through a website administered by the government, which would contain emissions data for all
sources in the region. When a proposed trade is submitted for approval, the website would
temporarily update its saved data to reflect the change in the geographic distribution of emis-
sions that would result from the proposed trade." Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz,
Markets and Geography: Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Re-
gional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L. Q. 569, 573 (2001).
22 See discussion infra Part V
23 See discussion infra Part M.
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meaning. The absence of legal obligations on the part of industrial
sources to mitigate the emissions was grounded, in turn, in a presumption
of local community consent to "trifling inconveniences" of this type. 24
Dissatisfaction with the common law's response to air pollution,
particularly where the property interests of the gentry were at stake,
prompted a series of legislative reforms in England beginning with the
Alkali Act of 1863.25 In its emphasis on proactive technological solu-
tions, rather than reactive proof of injury, the Alkali Act resembled conti-
nental regulatory approaches that were gaining hold during that time.
Variants of technology-based regimes had existed in Prussia at least
since 1845.26 By 1895, German law enabled pollution control authorities
to issue technical instructions and to require operators to conform with
"Stand der Technik" in meeting emission limits. 27 But whereas in Ger-
many technology standards accorded with prevailing regulatory practices
and became a standard operating procedure across multiple spheres of
environmental law, English technology standards existed in tension with
a countervailing policy discourse. 28 The same would remain true in the
United States, where technology standards were an important element of
the federal environmental regime enacted by Congress during the
1970s. 29
In stark contrast to the common law's locally differentiated environ-
mental standards, the 1970 Clean Air Act called for nationally uniform
air quality standards. 30 Congress's goal in theory, even if not in practice,
was equal environmental protection irrespective of socio-economic status
or economic conditions.3' The Act's shift towards greater uniformity,
especially its partial reliance on technology standards, soon met with
sharp criticism from economists and legal academics, primarily on effi-
24 See discussion infra Part III.
25 See discussion infra Part IV.
26 See Albert Weale, Vorsprung durch Technik?, in THE POLITICS OF GERMAN ENVIRON-
MENTAL REGULATION 159, 161-62 (Kenneth Dyson ed., 1992).
27 See id.
28 Charles Lees, Environmental Policy in the United Kingdom and Germany, 16 GER-
MAN POL. 164, 167 (2007) (contrasting the German reliance on a priori requirements guided
by abstract norms of Stand der Technik with the English preference for "focusing on specific
problems as and when they emerged and/or were identified as such" and tracing this diver-
gence back to the nineteenth century).
29 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 15, at 1334-35.
30 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000).
31 The Clean Air Act's chief architect, Senator Edmund Muskie, proclaimed that the Act
"intends that all Americans in all parts of the country shall have clean air to breathe within the
1970s." 116 CONG. REc. 42, 381 (1970). For the argument that where localized pollution is
concerned, the Clean Air Act did little to alter the preexisting common law regime, see NOGA
MORAG-LEVINE, CHASING THE WIND: REGULATING AIR POLLUTION IN THE COMMON LAW
STATE 103-42 (2003).
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ciency grounds. 32 It was within this context that reformers began to ar-
gue for the superiority of market-exchange-based regulatory instruments
over "command and control. '33 In the process, they swung the regula-
tory pendulum back in the direction of the common law.
On their face, pollution markets bear little resemblance to nuisance
law's reactive and court-based model of air pollution regulation. For
their operation, they depend on an extensive administrative apparatus to
set the overall targets, oversee the trades, and ensure compliance. 34
What these markets nonetheless share with the common law is the core
concept of a "right to pollute." In rejecting the ideal of uniform pollution
reductions in favor of greater flexibility in the location and scope of pol-
lution mitigation, pollution markets are consistent with a central tenet of
nuisance law. And as has been the case under common law, the eco-
nomic gains that this flexibility confers entail a tradeoff: Those in the
vicinity of sources who opt to buy pollution credits are generally left
worse off than they would have been under regimes that impose more
uniform controls. This distinction marks the central divide between the
common law and pollution markets, on the one hand, and technology-
based environmental standards, on the other.
Common law nuisance cases figured prominently in Ronald Coase's
article, The Problem of Social Cost.35  Coase's work is frequently
credited, in turn, as the inspiration behind proposals for tradable pollu-
tion permits from the late 1960s onward. 36 Unlike Coase, however,
neither the economic architects of these proposals, nor their many advo-
32 See BRUCE ACKERMAN & WILLIAM HASSLER, CLEAN COALJDIRTY AIR 122-23
(1981); ROBERT CRANDALL, Controlling Industrial Pollution: The Economics and Politics of
Clean Air 5-16 (1983); James E. KRIER, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards:
Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323, 324-35 (1974) (arguing that the Clean
Air Act's uniform standards are inefficient because they fail to take into account differences in
local conditions and preferences); Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risk
Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 153 (1988).
33 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 32, at 153-54.
34 See TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM
150 (1991) ("Tradeable discharge permits offer an effective way of introducing the discipline
of the market into pollution abatement, but they require political control and do not provide for
a complete market in pollution."); DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW 59 (2003).
35 See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1, 8-15 (1960).
36 Works linking the idea of emissions trading with Coase's influence include the follow-
ing: TIETENBERG, supra note 11, at 3; Steve Sorrell & Jim Skea, Introduction to EMISSIONS
TRADING FOR CLIMATE POLICY 1, 5 (Bernd Hansjiirgens ed., 2005) ("The idea of emissions
trading can be traced back to Herman Dales (1968), who elaborated the idea on the basis of
Ronald Coase's (1960) seminal paper."); Nathaniel 0. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz & Robert
N. Stavins, The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 313, 314 n.3 (1998) ("John Dales initially proposed a system of tradable permits to
control pollution .... However, much of the literature can be traced back to Ronald Coase.").
For analysis of the connection between Coase's argument and emissions trading, see infra Part
II.
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cates within the legal academy, have tended to frame their arguments in
reference to the common law. Yet the core concept that early writers on
emissions trading such as Thomas D. Crocker and J.H. Dales appeared to
borrow from Coase-the potential for legally protected rights to pollute
and an attendant expectation that levels of pollution control would vary
by locale 37-was the central insight Coase took from the common law.
The common law's longstanding preference for locally tailored defini-
tions of the pollution thresholds necessitating legal intervention was con-
sistent with Coase's own policy prescription on the inefficiency of legal
rules requiring across-the-board internalization of negative externalities,
such as pollution.38 Coase found evidence of an (implicit) symmetrical
construction of the competing rights at play in the common law's pro-
pensity to balance opposing economic interests in the course of adjudi-
cating nuisance disputes. On the one hand was the right of property
owners to put their resources to productive use even when that use im-
posed harm on others; on the other was the right of neighboring residents
not to be subjected to such harms.39 Neither right enjoyed a priori pro-
tection under a common law regime that varied the outcome of pollution
and other nuisance disputes in accordance with the circumstances of each
case. By highlighting the continuity with common law, Coase was able
to show that his argument-while novel in the context of the economic
theory of his day-came with a respectable legal pedigree.
Constructions of the harm associated with localized pollution as
"aesthetic" in nature played a pivotal role in the justification of the com-
mon law's locally differentiated regime. 40 In similar fashion, as the arti-
cle discusses, Coase restricted his treatment of the harm associated with
pollution to instances of injury to property and comfort and did not ex-
plicitly acknowledge the implications of a right to pollute for public
health. A similar pattern is evident in the rhetoric surrounding the dis-
tributive effects of pollution markets. Rarely, if ever, does one find ex-
plicit, efficiency-based, justifications for the added risk that such markets
may impose on some. Instead, two lines of response predominate. The
first, reminiscent of nuisance law, interprets scientific uncertainty on the
actual impact of trading as evidence of the absence of health effects. 4 '
37 See discussion infra Part V.
38 See discussion infra Part II.
39 See discussion infra Part II.
40 See discussion infra Part III.
41 A report published by the EPA's Office of Inspector General took issue with the
Agency's methodology and conclusions regarding the impact of the Clean Air Mercury Rule
on potential hotspots. The Inspector General's report concluded that "[sleveral uncertainties
associated with key variables in the analysis could affect the accuracy of the Agency's conclu-
sion that the Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR) will not result in 'utility-attributable' hotspots."
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, Report No. 2006-P-
00025, MONITORING NEEDED TO ASSESS IMPACT OF EPA's CLEAN AIR MERCURY RULE ON
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The second, as mentioned before, views the hotspot problem as amenable
to resolution through proper program design and monitoring. The vari-
ous proposals currently on the table in this regard are yet to be tested in
practice. 42 But the possibility, if only in theory, of a workable solution to
the hotspot problem helps to postpone discussion of how, if forced to
choose, we ought to balance the competing interests at stake. At issue, in
the final analysis, is the state's obligation to protect the neighbors of
industrial sources against pollution's harmful effects. The historic fact
that the common law has frequently found no such obligation can poten-
tially serve both sides in this debate. 43 Some, following Coase, may find
support for the economic and moral logic of different regulatory re-
sponses to pollution in the precedent offered by common law. Others
will view the neglect of preventable pollution "hotspots" under common
law nuisance doctrines-and their contemporary market-based prog-
eny-as their tragic flaw.
The family resemblance between pollution markets and the common
law is likewise relevant to current discussions of the fit between environ-
mental trading instruments and regulatory regimes outside of the United
States, most importantly in Europe. The enthusiasm with which Ameri-
can policy elites have greeted pollution markets has few parallels else-
where. Until quite recently, the United States was the only country to
implement large scale pollution markets. 44 The European Union's par-
ticipation in a cap-and-trade regime under the Kyoto Protocol as well as
a number of additional emission trading programs marked a notable
change in this respect.45 Notwithstanding, there remains significant re-
POTENTIAL HOTSPOTS (May 15, 2006), available at www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2006/20060515-
2006-P-00025.pdf. The EPA Office of Inspector General is an independent office within EPA
created by Congress in 1978 for the purpose of auditing EPA's activities and providing semi-
annual reports to Congress. EPA, Officer of Inspector General, http://www.epa.gov/oig/
aboutepaoig.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
42 See discussion infra Part V.
43 See discussion infra Part III.
44 See ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR POLLUTION CONTROL AND NATURAL RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT IN OECD COUNTRIES: A SURVEY 36 (1999).
45 Under the Kyoto protocol the EU has agreed to establish a cap-and-trade system to
limit CO 2 emissions from large industrial sources. Known as the European Union Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), this regime came into effect on January 1, 2005.
Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission.htm
(last visited Nov. 14, 2007). See also Sorrell & Skea, supra note 36, at 6 (noting that "[b]efore
the Kyoto Protocol was signed, Europe had almost no experience of emissions trading .... It
was the Kyoto Conference which finally brought about a change in instrument choice in some
European countries and which led to several programs and pilot studies in emissions trad-
ing."). This development is in large part due to the efforts of American officials and scholars
who have pushed for the introduction of this market-based instrument into international trea-
ties and domestic legal systems outside of the U.S. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Something Bor-
rowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental
Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1295, 1312-14 (2001) (discussing the U.S. role in the promotion of
2007]
170 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:161
sistance to the implementation of pollution markets in some European
Union member states, such as Germany.
46
The divergence between American and continental attitudes towards
pollution markets has predominantly been attributed to broad ideological
and cultural differences. 47 The suggested affinity between the common
law and tradable permit regimes sheds light on the specific source and
meaning of these differences. The resonance of pollution markets with
common law principles may well have enhanced their appeal in the
United States. At the same time, however, tension between these princi-
ples and a countervailing continental regulatory tradition may help ex-
plain cross-national differences in the enthusiasm with which the concept
of tradable pollution rights was embraced. A number of recent authors
have noted a potential incompatibility between emissions trading, on the
one hand, and the centrality of technology standards under the contempo-
rary European precautionary and "polluter pays" principles, on the
other.48 This article points to a complementary line of argument on the
origin of cross-national differences in this respect by highlighting the
continuity between the common law and pollution markets.4
9
emissions trading during the negotiations leading to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the Kyoto Protocol).
46 See Lees, supra note 28, at 176-77; Bemd Schdrer, Tradable Emission Permits in
German Clean Air Policy: Considerations on the Efficiency of Environmental Policy Instru-
ments, in POLLUTION FOR SALE: EMISSIONS TRADING AND JOINT IMPLEMENTATION 141, 141
(Steve Sorrell & Jim Skea eds., 1998) (reporting on the failure in Germany of proposals to
introduce economic instruments as a substitute, or supplement, to technology standards. Con-
cerns over the potential of such instruments to create harmful concentrations of pollutants, and
the greater stringency (relative to the U.S.) of Germany's pollution control standards are
among the reasons cited for the proposals' failure).
47 See Katrina Miriam Wyman, Why Regulators Turn to Tradable Permits: A Canadian
Case Study, 52 U. Toronto L.J. 419, 420-421 (2002) (reporting on the prevalence of cultural
explanations for the skepticism towards pollution markets outside of the United States). Wy-
man's article, however, posits an economic, rather than cultural, explanation for Canada's slow
pace in this respect. See id.
48 See Michael Bothe, Economic Instruments for Environmental Protection: Introduction
to the European Experience, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND MARKET MECHANISMS 251, 255
(Klaus Bosselmann & Benjamin J. Richardson eds., 1999) (identifying a potential incompati-
bility between tradable permits and "technology-related emission standards based on the pre-
cautionary principle" as that principle is understood in European Community law); Isabel
Rauch, Developing a German and an International Emissions Trading System-Lessons from
U.S. Experiences with the Acid Rain Program, 11 FORDHAM EN VTL. L. REV. 307, 382-84
(2000) (noting that the introduction of emissions trading could lead to a violation of the pre-
cautionary principle and, as a consequence, violation of domestic German air pollution legisla-
tion). See generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable
Pollution Allowances and the "Polluter Pays" Principle, 24 HARV. ENVL. L. REV. 465
(2000) (pointing to a potential conflict between tradable pollution allowances and the "polluter
pays" principle).
49 Additional support for the potential influence of common law principles on a coun-
try's receptivity to pollution markets may be found in the leadership role that England has
played in the promotion of emissions trading within the European Union. See Lees, supra note
28, at 174.
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Viewed in this fashion, efforts to transplant 50 pollution markets can
be seen in reference to a historical dialectic between common law and
civil law regulatory instruments. 5 ' Whereas technology standards en-
tered England and the United States in response to dissatisfaction with
the common law's failure to force the implementation of feasible pollu-
tion controls, emission trading evolved as a corrective response to the
perceived deficiencies of uniform pollution control standards. 52 In sanc-
tioning variation in pollution-reduction levels across sources, this reform
effort aligned with the historical treatment of pollution under nuisance
law. Thus, recognition of the divergent legal traditions from which tech-
nology standards and emissions trading have evolved can enhance our
understanding of the origins of cross-national differences and the pros-
pects for convergence in choice between these regulatory instruments.
Part I of this article examines Coase's argument on the proper regu-
latory response to pollution. The section divides into two subparts. The
first focuses on the role of reciprocal constructions of pollution problems
in Coase's refraining of such problems in reference to the competing
rights of polluters and their neighbors. The second discusses the paral-
lels that Coase identified between his approach and that of nuisance doc-
trine under common law. Part II offers a brief account of the origins and
evolution of the common law doctrines allowing for differentiated levels
of pollution reduction in accordance with the circumstances and condi-
tions of the relevant communities. Highlighted in this section is the role
of scientific uncertainty over the health effects of pollution in the com-
mon law's locality-based distinction between levels of pollution justify-
ing legal intervention. Part III discusses the emergence of uniform,
technology-based regimes in response to the perceived failures of the
common law from the nineteenth century onward. The deficiencies asso-
ciated with such uniform regimes generated, in turn, proposals for mar-
ket-based reforms as Part IV relates. Building on Coase's arguments,
advocates of pollution markets offered an alternative to across-the-board
mitigation of all pollution sources. But in the face of accumulating evi-
dence on the health effects of pollution, the policy imperative of prevent-
ing localized hotspots has become far more evident. As a result,
proponents of emissions trading labor under the contradiction between
the logic of differentiated responses to pollution, on the one hand, and
the commitments of a regulatory regime pledged in principle to the pro-
50 For analysis of international diffusion of emissions trading through the lens of legal
transplantation, see Wiener, supra note 45, at 1312-14 (discussing the U.S. role in the promo-
tion of emissions trading during the negotiations leading to the Framework Convention on
Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol).
51 Noga Morag-Levine, Civil Law, Common Law, and the Administrative State: From
Early-Modern England to the Lochner Era, CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2007).
52 See discussion infra Parts IV and V.
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tection of all citizens everywhere, on the other. Tracing this dilemma to
the core assumptions of the common law, Part V argues in conclusion,
can better illuminate the tradeoffs inherent to the choice between the
competing regulatory paradigms.
I. COASE, POLLUTION RIGHTS AND THE COMMON LAW
The post-World War II era brought increased public concern with
air pollution and growing dissatisfaction with the common law's re-
sponse to the problem, both in England and the United States. 53 The
political processes in both countries that would result in comprehensive
environmental regulation by the 1970s were already gaining force during
the 1950s. 54 Coase's article was conceived against this backdrop.
A. COASE ON POLLUTION AS A RECIPROCAL HARM
Coase's The Problem of Social Cost began as follows: "This paper
is concerned with those actions of business firms which have harmful
effects on others. The standard example is that of a factory the smoke
from which has harmful effects on those occupying neighboring proper-
ties."55 Towards the conclusion of the article, he, once again, offered
smoke as a paradigmatic illustration of the type of harm at issue. 56 The
regulation of pollution, specifically air pollution, was seemingly the
problem to which Coase's article spoke most directly, even though it was
in reference to the political economy of broadcasting that Coase first de-
veloped the central elements of his theory. 57
In 1959, Coase published an article in which he advocated a market-
based alternative to the allocation of broadcasting licenses by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC).58 Within that context, Coase ar-
gued that the scope of government oversight of the distribution of li-
censes would be greatly reduced with the establishment of property
rights in scarce frequencies. 59 A legal system was necessary to define
such property rights and arbitrate disputes, but the price mechanism,
53 See discussion infra Part IV.
54 For efforts geared at the control of air pollution in the United States during the 1950s,
see generally ScoTr HAMILTON DEWEY, DON'T BREATHE THE Am: Am POLLUTION AND U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, 1945-1970 (2000); AIR POLLUTION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED
STATES TECHNICAL CONFERENCE ON AIR POLLUTION (Louis C. McCabe eds., 1952). Regard-
ing developments in England during this period, see ERIC ASHBY & MARY ANDERSON, THE
POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR 104-30 (1981).
55 Coase, supra note 35, at 1.
56 Id. at 41-42.
57 See id. at 1 n.1.
58 R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1959)
[hereinafter Coase, The Federal Communications Commission].
59 See id. at 14-18.
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rather than the FCC, could allocate these rights.60 Coase anticipated the
objection that tradable rights of this type ought not to extend to actions
that inflict direct harm on others, such as the right to interfere with the
signals of other operators. 6 1 In response, he offered the 1879 English
case of Sturges v. Bridgman to illustrate the absence of an "analytical
difference between the right to use a resource without direct harm to
others and the right to conduct operations in such a way as to produce
direct harm to others." 62
At issue in Sturges was a dispute between neighbors over noise
coming out of a confectioner's kitchen.63 The plaintiff, a doctor, con-
tended that the noise from the confectioner's machinery interfered with
his ability to care for patients. 64 Finding that the doctor had a right to be
free of noise that interfered with the practice of his profession, the court
granted an injunction. 65 Coase, however, went on to argue that the court,
in upholding the doctor's right to practice his profession free of noise,
denied the confectioner the right to utilize machinery necessary for the
practice of his trade. 66 "In each case something is denied to others: in
one case, use of a resource; in the other, use of a mode of operation. 67
Since the infliction of harm as such cannot be avoided, the goal is "to
avoid the more serious harm. '68 This outcome, in some instances, may
be achieved through negotiation between the parties once property rights
are specified. In other instances, government regulation may be a more
appropriate instrument. 69
In his article on the FCC, Coase offered air pollution, where there
exist multiple emitters and multiple receptors, as the paradigmatic exam-
ple of a harm that may not be amenable to a market solution. 70 In the
face of such pollution, Coase noted, it may well be preferable for the
state to dictate "the location of economic activities, methods of produc-
tion, and so on."'71 The elimination of air pollution was not, however, the
proper goal of such regulation, according to Coase.72 Instead, the goal
60 Id. at 14. As Coase noted, the idea of using the price mechanism to allocate broadcast-
ing frequencies was advanced earlier by Leo Hetzel. See Leo Herzel, "Public Interest" and
the Market in Color Television Regulation, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 802, 809 (1951).
61 Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, supra note 58, at 26.
62 Id. (discussing Sturges v. Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch. D. 852).
63 Sturges v. Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch. D. 852, 853.
64 Id.
65 See id. at 857-59.
66 See Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, supra note 58, at 26-27.
67 Id. at 26.
68 Id.
69 See id. at 29.
70 See id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
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was to "bring about the optimum amount of smoke pollution. '73 This
meant, in turn, that "[t]he gains from reducing [smoke pollution] have to
be matched with the loss in production due to the restrictions in choice of
methods of production, etc."'74 Here as elsewhere, "the solution to be
sought is that which would have been achieved if the institution of pri-
vate property and the pricing mechanism were working well." 75
Whether this solution was the product of actual market transactions or
regulatory instruments was of secondary significance for Coase. Moving
the problem of pollution to center stage, Coase reiterated the same line of
argument in his 1960 article. 76
Both articles addressed the same core issue: the proper regulatory
response to instances where the price mechanism fails to function effec-
tively. In the case of radio transmission, the failure followed from the
absence of clearly specified property rights. In the case of pollution and
other harms inflicted in the course of economic activity, the ability of
producers to pass some of the costs of production to third parties under-
cut the price mechanism. In The Problem of Social Cost, Coase sought
to expose what he perceived to be a fundamental error in the prevailing
economic theory regarding harmful business activity. Economists, Coase
argued, have followed A.C. Pigou in analyzing such harmful effects "in
terms of a divergence between the private and social product of the fac-
tory. '77 Working within this framework, they have tended to recom-
mend three categories of regulatory responses to harms such as pollution.
The first imposed legal liability on the owner of the factory for the dam-
age he caused. 78 The second placed "tax on the factory owner . . .
equivalent in money terms to the damage it would cause."'79 The third
excluded factories from residential districts and other areas where "the
emission of smoke would have harmful effects on others." 80 The denom-
inator linking all three was a demand that industrial sources, irrespective
of circumstances, either take precautions not to harm others or pay for
any harm they inflict. This result, Coase argued, was based on faulty
reasoning because it failed to recognize that the harm in question was
reciprocal, rather than unidirectional. 81
Rather than perceiving a situation in which "A inflicts harm on B"
as the conventional wisdom would have it, Coase blamed the unfortunate
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See Coase, supra note 35, at 1.
77 Id. at 1.
78 See id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 2.
81 See id.
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proximity between incompatible land uses-rather than the actions of
any one side-for the creation of harm. 82 Wandering cattle where there
were no farmers and pollution sources devoid of neighbors would not
impose a social cost. And because no one party bore responsibility for
the harm thus suffered, neither merited a priori protection. 83 Framed in
this fashion, the pertinent question was not "how should we restrain A
from injuring B." Instead, "[t]he real question that has to be decided is:
should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A?" 84
Since one or another will inevitably be harmed, "[t]he problem is to
avoid the more serious harm. '85
Avoiding the more serious harm required a shift away from the pre-
vention of externalized harms to the prevention only of those harms that
inflict greater losses than benefits. Balancing of this sort is what Coase
meant when he called for a regulatory regime focused on "total effect." 86
Properly functioning markets maximized the relevant total effect through
free exchange. In the absence of such markets, the role of government
was to replicate, as far as possible, the outcome that well-functioning
markets would have produced. Coase's frequently cited scenario involv-
ing cattle straying onto cropland was designed to show that the results
obtained through the market indeed tend to maximize total effect.8 7
Under this scenario, ranchers stood in for polluting industries and farm-
ers for these industries' neighbors. Coase's insight was to show that, in
the absence of transaction costs, the efficient solution to a dispute be-
tween these parties would come through bargaining between them, irre-
spective of whether the law's initial grant of rights favored the interests
of farmers or ranchers. Regardless of the starting legal position, ranchers
and farmers, where free to negotiate, would settle on the result that best
"maximises the value of production" in the aggregate. 88
The challenge, hence, was to forge regulatory instruments capable
of replicating this outcome in the presence of transaction costs. It was a
mistake, however, to deduce, following Pigou, that regulatory interven-
tion was justified wherever economic activity inflicted harm. Rather, the
criterion that ought to govern economic policy here, as elsewhere, is a
comparison of "the total product yielded by alternative social arrange-
ments." 89 Some business-inflicted harms may justify corrective action
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 44.
87 See id. at 2-8.
88 Id. at 8.
89 Id. at 43. Coase explains in this connection that notwithstanding his reliance on con-
ventional economic terminology on the aggregation of the value of production, "it is, of
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under this criterion. In other cases, however, corrective measures "may
well produce more harm than the original deficiency." 90 In the latter
case, there existed no economic rationale for controlling pollution, irre-
spective of the availability of feasible means of mitigation. The conclu-
sion cut against prevailing economic prescriptions, but, as Coase went on
to show, was compatible with the historical practice under common law.
B. COASE ON THE ECONOMIC LOGIC OF NUISANCE LAW
In the longstanding propensity of common law judges to balance the
interests of nuisance plaintiffs and defendants, Coase found evidence that
these judges were "aware (as many economists are not) of the reciprocal
nature of the problem." 9' Coase acknowledged that the necessity of rul-
ing on liability hindered explicit recognition of this reciprocity under
common law. 92 But the tendency of judges to balance the respective
economic rights was inconsistent with unidirectional causal
constructions.
Coase distinguished in this connection between trends in American
and English nuisance doctrines. Quoting Prosser and the Second Re-
statement on Torts, Coase noted that American writers on the topic en-
gage in explicit comparison between the utility and harm created by a
defendant's economic activity in assessing the existence of a nuisance. 93
English writers tend to be less explicit on the subject, but lean in the
same direction nonetheless. 94 Moreover, "in the reports of individual
cases, it is clear that the judges have had in mind what would be lost as
well as what would be gained in deciding whether to grant an injunction
or award damages. '95
As evidence, Coase once again turned to Sturges v. Bridgman, the
doctor/confectioner case that served to illustrate the principle of recipro-
cal causation in his FCC article. 96 On the face of it, the outcome of the
case was consistent with unidirectional constructions of harm, since the
course, desirable that the choice between different social arrangements for the solution of
economic problems should be carried out in broader terms than this and that the total effect of
these arrangements in all spheres of life should be taken into account." Id. In this fashion,
Coase allowed for the inclusion of a host of aesthetic and moral preferences in the aggregation
of total effect for the purpose of economic policy.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 19.
92 See id. at 13.
93 Coase offers the following quote from Prosser: "The world must have factories, smelt-
ers, oil refineries, noisy machinery and blasting, even at the expense of some inconvenience to
those in the vicinity and the plaintiff may be required to accept some not unreasonable discom-
fort for the general good." Id. at 20 (quoting W.L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 398-99 (2d
ed. 1955)).
94 See id.
95 Id.
96 See id. at 8-9 (discussing Sturges v. Bridgman, (1879) I1 Ch. D. 865).
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plaintiff-doctor enjoined the confectioner. But the result, Coase argued
elsewhere in the article, was indeed consistent with a reciprocal construc-
tion of the harm since the court's reasoning made it clear that the upscale
residential nature of the neighborhood in question was highly material to
the case's result.97 The same complaint, if brought in an industrial locale
would likely have met with failure since the pertinent economic balance
would cut the other way. This followed from the rule that what consti-
tuted an actionable nuisance was contingent on time and place:
[W]hether anything is a nuisance or not is a question to
be determined, not merely by an abstract consideration
of the thing itself, but in reference to the circumstances;
What would be a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not
necessarily be so in Bermondsey; and where a locality is
devoted to a particular trade or manufacture carried on
by the traders or manufacturers in a particular and estab-
lished manner not constituting a public nuisance. Judges
and juries would be justified in finding, and may be
trusted to find, that the trade or manufacture so carried
on in that locality is not a private or actionable wrong. 98
The doctrine encapsulated in this case distinguished between two
categories of plaintiffs: the first were located in residential neighbor-
hoods where there was little if any industrial and business activity; the
second were in industrial and commercial locales. Whereas the first cat-
egory of plaintiffs was entitled to protection against harmful effects in-
flicted by the neighbors in the course of business activity, the second was
not. The law's refusal to compensate plaintiffs in industrial locales was
justified, in turn, by the latter's voluntary decision to reside within such
an area. On this point, Coase quoted Salmond on the Law of Torts in
support: "He who dislikes the noise of traffic must not set up his abode in
the heart of a great city. He who loves peace and quiet must not live in a
locality devoted to the business of making boilers or steamships." 99
Functional distinctions between types of land uses did not exhaust
the considerations that courts took into account in the assessment of rele-
vant neighborhood characteristics. Differences in socio-demographic
status were likewise incorporated into the analysis as Coase's discussion
of Adams v. Ursell went on to show. 100 This case concerned odors and
other interferences caused by a fried fish shop. 10' The neighborhood in
97 See id. at 19.
98 Id. at 21 (quoting Sturges v. Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch. D. 865).
99 Id. (quoting SIR JOHN WILLIAM SALMOND, SALMOND ON THE LAW OF TORTS 182
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 12th ed., 1957)).
100 See id. (discussing Adams v. Ursell, (1913) 1 Ch. 269).
101 Adams v. Ursell, (1913) 1 Ch. 269, 269.
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question was predominantly working-class, but the defendant located his
shop near houses of "a much better character."' 0 2 The court granted an
injunction notwithstanding the defendant's contention that "an injunction
would cause great hardship to [him] and to the poor people who get food
at his shop."' 1 3 In rejecting the argument, the court explained that "it
does not follow that the defendant cannot carry on his business in another
more suitable place somewhere in the neighbourhood. It by no means
follows that because a fried fish shop is a nuisance in one place it is a
nuisance in another."' °4 In accordance with this logic, the court granted
the injunction but refused to extend it to the entire street as requested.' 05
The defendant was thus free to relocate to a less distinguished area of the
same neighborhood. The opinion did not address the relevance of the
value of affected property to the question of whether fried fish smells
amounted to an actionable nuisance. But Coase offered an explanation
of his own. The proper place for the store was in proximity to less
wealthy residents in the area since they "would no doubt consider the
availability of fish-and-chips to out-weigh the pervading odour and 'fog
or mist' so graphically described by the plaintiff."10 6 The neighbor-
hood's poor residents, in other words, were presumed to consent to inter-
ferences of this type whereas the same assumption did not apply to richer
folks living in the same area.
Across these and the other cases he discusses, Coase highlighted the
contextual nature of common law decision making in disputes of this
type. 10 7 Depending on the characteristics of the location, the costs of
mitigation, and other circumstances, common law judges fashioned rem-
edies to pollution and similar interferences on a case-by-case basis.
Whereas some plaintiffs were seen deserving of damages or injunctive
relief, others exposed to similar harms were not. Unmitigated pollution,
noise, or other harmful effects were deemed, in such instances, consistent
with common law principles. Coase argued that the common law ac-
corded with economic precepts in this regard. 10 8 Eschewing uniform de-
mands for across-the-board mitigation of harmful effects such as
pollution, the common law hinged its intervention on cost-benefit calcu-
lations specifically tailored to the circumstances at hand. Where the per-
tinent balance favored the status quo, the proper legal response was to
102 Id. at 270.
103 Id. at 271.
104 id. at 271-72.
105 See id. at 272.
106 See Coase, supra note 35, at 22.
107 See id. passim (citing numerous cases from both England and America, many of
which are discussed at some length).
108 See id. at 27-28.
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leave things alone. The existence of localized pollution hotspots was
intrinsic to this outcome.
The following section provides a brief historical overview of the
origins and evolution of common law responses to pollution and similar
harms under nuisance law. Consistent with Coase's account, the com-
mon law often denied plaintiffs a remedy against industrial pollution,
notwithstanding ample evidence of injury to physical wellbeing and/or
property. In such cases, it may be said that the law's refusal to intervene
implicitly recognized defendants' rights to engage in the activities in
question, notwithstanding the consequences suffered by others.
II. THE COMMON LAW'S LOCALITY DOCTRINE: A
BRIEF HISTORY
The common law's reliance on community characteristics in differ-
entiating between pollution levels that constitute a nuisance is sometimes
known as the locality doctrine. 10 9 Robert Bone distinguishes between
two versions of the doctrine. The first sets "a higher interference thresh-
old for urban than for nonurban areas." 110 The second makes "more re-
fined distinctions among types of neighborhoods within an urban area,"
parallel to the function that zoning ordinances later came to assume."'
Writing in reference to dominant jurisprudential trends between 1850
and 1920, Bone notes that courts most often relied on the locality doc-
trine when deciding not to impose liability. 1 2 When judges provided
normative justification for this action and the plaintiffs subsequent loss,
they frequently invoked the utilitarian line of argument reasoning that
"residence owners ought to bear a certain amount of interference for the
gain in social utility that the interfering uses made possible." ' 1 3 As Bone
observes, this line of reasoning existed in tension with concurrent con-
ceptions of property rights as both natural and absolute.' 14 This conflict
accounted in large part for the lack of "internally consistent normative
theory" in late nineteenth-century nuisance doctrine. 1 5 This tension,
however, was not novel to the nineteenth century. Early seventeenth-
109 Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law:
1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1150 (1986).
110 Id. at 1151.
111 Id. ("Once a particular locality was taken over by interfering uses, a residence-owner
remaining in that area was able to obtain relief only against a use that substantially increased
the level of interference above that normally prevailing in the area. If an interfering use were
to locate in a primarily residential area, however, the use could be enjoined.").
112 Id. at 1153.
113 Id.
114 See id. at 1153-54.
115 Id. at 1224.
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century nuisance cases reveal that courts had struggled with this dilemma
at least since then.
A. SIC UTERE AND LOCALITY DISTINCTIONS IN THE SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY
For centuries, in adjudicating air pollution disputes, common law
judges have worked under the guide of a Latin maxim invoked by Lord
Coke in William Aldred's Case:116 sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas11 7
or "use your own [property] so as not to harm another."' 18 The principle
behind these words seems unambiguous. Land should not be used so as
to inflict injury on one's neighbors. In other words, regardless of the
benefit to the landowner or his community at large, the landowner's
neighbors have a seemingly absolute right to enjoy their property free
from harm by the landowner. Yet, a closer reading of Aldred's Case
reveals that for Coke, sic utere was derivative of the existence of alterna-
tive, more appropriate locations for undertaking particular economic
activities.
The case concerned a conflict between William Aldred and his pig-
farming neighbor, Thomas Benton. 119 The pigs' "fetid and unwhole-
some stink" moved Aldred to bring suit, alleging that he and his servants
could not stay in his house "without danger of infection."'120 A jury
found for Aldred and awarded him damages. 121 Benton appealed argu-
ing that "the building of the house for hogs was necessary for the suste-
nance of man: and one ought not to have so delicate a nose, that he
cannot bear the smell of hogs."' 122 The judges, however, upheld the
jury's award. 123 Lord Coke explained the decision in reference to the sic
utere maxim. 124 The lesson imputed was that the importance of pig
farming did not confer on its practitioners a right to pollute the property
of their neighbors. It would be incorrect, however, to read sic utere in
this context as a cost-oblivious doctrine exclusively committed to the
116 William Aldred's Case, (1611) 9 Co. Rep. 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B.). William
Aldred's Case is Coke's report of the decision rendered in Aldred v. Benton, (1610) 9 Co. Rep.
57.
117 Id. at 821.
118 MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 31, 39-62. The remainder of this Section draws heavily
upon chapter 3.
119 William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 816 (K.B.).
120 Coke's report incorporates the quotation from the lower court's decision in Law
French. The English translation of the quoted language is from Aldred v. Benton, (1610), in
J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY: PRIVATE LAW TO 1750,
at 599, 600 (1986).
121 William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 817.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 821.
THE PROBLEM OF POLLUTION HOTSPOTS
protection of plaintiffs' property rights. Rather than being indifferent to
Benton's claim on the necessity of pigs to the "sustenance of man," Lord
Coke's opinion seems to find that argument immaterial. The issue was
not the need for pigs but the need for a proper location for the pigs. Lord
Coke offered two further examples to illustrate this point:
[T]he building of a lime-kiln is good and profitable; but
if it be built so near a house, that when it burns the
smoke thereof enters into the house, so that none can
dwell there, an action lies for it. So if a man has a water-
course running in a ditch from the river to his house, for
his necessary use; if a glover sets up a lime-pit for calve
skins and sheep skins so near the said water course that
the corruption of the lime-pit has corrupted it, for which
cause his tenants leave the said house, an action on the
case lies for it. 125
In other words, Benton was liable for nuisance not because he raised
malodorous pigs, but because he did so in an inappropriate locale.
The backdrop to Aldred's Case was an era of marked growth in
land-use disputes of this type. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
were a time of increased migration from the countryside to towns and
cities. 126 In turn, this influx contributed to the change in land-use pat-
terns within urban centers, marked by greater differentiation among land
uses and social classes. 127 The protection that Aldred's Case conferred
on residential areas accorded with this trend by helping to direct manu-
facturing and other interfering land uses to the outskirts of towns and
cities. At the same time, this doctrine seemed to impose no requirement
that pig farmers (or other sources of pollution) take feasible precautions
to mitigate their impact when properly located. The connection between
the location of sources and applicable control requirements was made
perhaps even more evident in Jones v. Powell,128 another early air pollu-
tion case.
The plaintiff in Jones v. Powell, a registrar to the court of the bishop
of Gloucester, complained that because of the coal smoke from the de-
fendant's brewhouse, the air in his own house was "corrupted so that he
and all the inhabitants of his house [were] deprived of their health and by
125 Id. (emphasis added).
126 PETER CLARK & PAUL SLACK, CRISIS AND ORDER IN ENGLISH TowNs 1500-1700, at
17 (Peter Clark & Paul Slack eds., 1972) (attributing urban population increase in the sixteenth
century to both growth in the indigenous urban population and immigration from the
countryside).
127 SYB3L M. JACK, TowNs IN TUDOR AND STUART BRITAIN 13-18 (1996) (describing
changes in the social organization of urban areas between 1500 and 1700).
128 Jones v. Powell, [1628] Palm 536, 81 Eng. Rep. 1208.
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the said continual smoking his records and papers [were] putrefied and
spoiled."' 129 A jury found for the plaintiff. 130 On appeal, the defendant
(echoing Benton's argument above) moved that an "action does not lie in
general for building a brewhouse, for it is a thing necessary for the com-
mon wealth inasmuch as man cannot live without drink."' 31 The plain-
tiff responded that the injury could be avoided through the burning of
wood or charcoal, rather than coal. 132 The defendant answered with the
argument that "sea-coal is the ordinary fuel of the realm and is necessa-
rily to be used because wood in recent times has become so scarce that
there is no sufficient stock of it in the realm."' 33
The backdrop to the case, as hinted by the defendant's argument,
was the growing scarcity of wood in the wake of massive logging. 134 An
attendant switch to coal aggravated smoke problems in urban centers.' 3 5
The dispute at issue in the case was paradigmatic of a major, and rela-
tively novel, environmental problem in need of regulatory redress. As
one of the judges in Jones stated, "the chief question in the case seems to
be whether the burning of sea-coal causes the action to lie."' 136 In formu-
lating the applicable rule, the judges faced a choice between three theo-
retical alternatives. First, by answering the question in the affirmative,
the judges would have imposed an across-the-board liability on all users
of coal, encouraging reliance on alternative fuels. Second, by taking the
opposite view, the judges would have exempted all coal-burners from
liability for the smoke. The third choice would have been to make liabil-
ity contingent on the characteristics of the neighborhood in question.
The four judges who reviewed the case on appeal divided over the
choice between the latter two options.137 None, however, endorsed the
view that coal smoke gave rise to liability in all circumstances. 138 Two
of the judges held that there was no action against burning coal. The
argument offered was that "this is the common and principal fuel of the
realm; and if subjects were to be compelled to brew with any other fuel,
then on account of the scarcity and expense thereof no one would do it,
and then great prejudice would accrue to the common wealth."' 139 The
129 Jones v. Powell (1629), in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 120, at 601, 601 (1986). The
quotes from Jones v. Powell refer to an English translation of the decision from Law French.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 601-02.
133 Id. at 602.
134 BARBARA FREESE, COAL: A HUMAN HISTORY 30 (2003).
135 Id. at 34-37.
136 Jones v. Powell (1629), in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 120, at 601, 602.
137 Id. at 602-05. Presumably because the judges were evenly divided, the jury verdict in
favor of the plaintiff was undisturbed.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 602.
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other two judges ruled that the brewery ought to be liable, with one spe-
cifically invoking the locality doctrine in support:
But one may use a trade that is lawful in itself in such a
way that it shall be noxious and unlawful. Thus, if a
butcher (which is a trade lawful and necessary for the
public good) uses his trade in Cheapside, certainly an
action lies against him by those who live there. There is
a lawful place for such noisome trades, such as the
Shambles at Newgate, and therefore not action lies
against a butcher who occupies his trade there, since it is
a proper place for it. 140
Consistent with Coase's analysis, properly located noxious businesses-
for example, butchers at the Shambles at Newgate-may be said to have
possessed, under this doctrine, a right to practice their trade irrespective
of associated harms. This right existed, however, in tension with the sic
utere doctrine's apparently absolutist proscription. In response, common
law judges turned to two, often interrelated tools. The first minimized
the relevant injury as justification for why it failed to qualify as a legally
actionable harm, and the second imputed consent to prevailing conditions
in polluted locales by virtue of the decision to reside within them. The
foundation for this rhetorical move was already put in place by Coke in
Aldred's Case.
B. "TRIFLING INCONVENIENCES": AIR POLLUTION, SCIENTIFIC
UNCERTAINTY, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF HARM
Sic utere, Coke was careful to explain, was not a categorical prohi-
bition against any kind of harm brought by interfering land uses. Aldred
prevailed not only because defendant was located in the wrong place but
because his complaint also concerned "matters of necessity," such as
"wholesome air."'14 1 He would, however, have failed had his complaint
regarded "matter[s] of delight". 142 Coke's report on the case did not ex-
plain why "matter[s] of delight" fell outside sic utere's domain. 143 The
implicit rationale, however, seems to hark back to another ancient
maxim: de minimis non curat lex, or "the law does not concern itself with
trifles."' 144 The de minimis principle is understood conventionally as a
barrier against frivolous litigation-an instrument for keeping minor an-
noyances out of court. 145 But this interpretation overlooks the capacity
140 Id. at 603.
141 William Aldred's Case, (1611) 9 Co. Rep. 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 821 (K.B.).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (8th ed. 2004).
145 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity 118, at 599 (1996).
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of de minimis to function as an instrument for balancing competing inter-
ests. In the absence of a preexisting definition of what constitutes "a
trifle," de minimis leaves it up to judges to make the call. In the process,
the boundaries between objective assessment of the relevant injury and
considerations of public policy are easily blurred. 
146
Two and a half centuries after Aldred's Case, the House of Lords
built on the de minimis principle in the landmark case of St. Helen's v.
Tipping.147 St. Helen's, like Aldred's Case, concerned air pollution.148
But whereas the complaint in Aldred's was over the smells of a single
pigsty, 149 at issue in St. Helen's were "noxious vapours" from a large
copper smelter, one of a number in that locale. 150 Emissions from cop-
per smelters were a recurrent source of concern throughout the nine-
teenth century. 15' Complaints associated with such smelters focused on
two categories of harm: injury to land as manifested by denuded forests,
wilted vegetation, and failed crops; and injury to human health, including
both immediate physical discomfort and worry about long-term dis-
ease. 152 Tipping, the plaintiff in St. Helen's, included both sets of con-
cerns in his complaint in the case.153 The owner of a 1,300-acre estate
outside the industrial town of St. Helens, Tipping blamed the smelter's
emissions for direct damage to property in the form of destroyed vegeta-
tion and "the very unpleasant nature of the vapour, which ... affected
persons as well as plants in his grounds." 154
St. Helens was an industrial area and as such, constituted a "proper"
location for copper smelting.' 5 5 Notwithstanding this fact, the plaintiff
sought relief under the sic utere doctrine. 156 Mellor, the trial judge, re-
sponded through jury instructions that made recovery for injury from
noxious vapours contingent on proof of visible diminishment in "the
value of the property and the comfort and enjoyment of it.' ' 157 Under
this instruction, Tipping could easily recover for damage to his lands and
146 As Coke made clear, "matters of delight" was not intended as a synonym for minor
concerns. He offered interference with a pleasant view from a dwelling ("prospect" in the
language of the case) as the type of harm that would fail to qualify as a "matter of necessity."
This, notwithstanding the fact that "it is a great commendation of a house if it has a long and
large prospect." See William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 821.
147 St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, (1865) 11 Eng. Rep. 1483 (H.L.).
148 See id. at 1483.
149 See William Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 821.
15o See St. Helen's Smelting Co., 11 Eng. Rep. at 1483.
151 Edmund Newell, Atmospheric Pollution and the British Copper Industry, 1690-1920,
38 TECH. & CuLTURE 655, 656 (1997).
152 Id. at 660-667.
153 St. Helen's Smelting Co., 11 Eng. Rep. at 1483-84.
154 Id. at 1484.
155 See id. at 1497.
156 See id.
157 Id. at 1484.
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vegetation. But Judge Mellor added, paraphrasing the de minimis princi-
ple, "[t]he law did not regard trifling inconveniences."' 158 The inconve-
niences in question were the amalgam of physical symptoms and health
concerns associated with exposure to the pollution, which were deemed
trivial in the absence of scientific proof linking such exposure with tangi-
ble physical or property injury.
The jury awarded Tipping damages for injury to his estate but not
for comfort and enjoyment. 159 On appeal, the House of Lords upheld the
award and the jury instructions.' 60 Lord Westbury, the Lord Chancellor,
distinguished in his opinion between two categories of injury from nox-
ious vapors: the first, where "sensible injury to the value of the property"
existed; the second, where it did not.1 6 1 In the first instance plaintiffs
could recover, irrespective of the nature of the locale.1 62 However,
where the alleged injury was to comfort and enjoyment of life, rather
than the value of property, the meaning of legal injury varied with the
characteristics of the place:
[W]ith regard to... the personal inconvenience and in-
terference with one's enjoyment, one's quiet, one's per-
sonal freedom, anything that discomposes or injuriously
affects the senses or the nerves, whether that may or may
not be denominated a nuisance, must undoubtedly de-
pend greatly on the circumstances of the place where the
thing complained of actually occurs. If a man lives in a
town, it is necessary that he subject himself to the conse-
quences of those operations of trade which may be car-
ried on in his immediate locality, which are actually
necessary for trade and commerce ... and of the public
at large. 163
Lord Westbury's logic echoed Coke's distinction between "matters
of necessity" and "matters of delight." But whereas in Aldred's Case,
"unwholesome air" associated with pigs' odors qualified as a remediable
legal injury, 16 4 in St. Helen's, the denuding of trees for miles around by
copper smelting emissions was dismissed as a "trifling inconvenience,"
simply an aesthetic injury. 165 Having trivialized the relevant injury in this
fashion, Lord Westbury offered the following admonition: "Where great
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1486.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 See William Aldred's Case, (1611) 9 Co. Rep. 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 821-22 (K.B.).
165 St. Helen's Smelting Co., 11 Eng. Rep. at 1483.
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works had been erected, and carried on, persons must not stand on their
extreme rights, and bring actions in respect of every matter of annoy-
ance."'166 Within a decade, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would cite
St. Helen's on this point in explanation of why smoke and gas generated
by a brick manufacturer in the vicinity of Pittsburgh did not constitute a
nuisance: "The people who live in such a city or within its sphere of
influence do so of choice, and they voluntarily subject themselves to its
peculiarities and its discomforts, for the greater benefit they think they
derive from their residence or their business there."'167
Under this framework, the decision to reside in the vicinity of indus-
trial sources suggested acceptance of the environmental conditions char-
acteristic of such areas, and equity concerns were thus inapplicable to
pollution concentrations. A bargain was struck implicitly between indus-
trial sources and their neighbors under the view that the area would be
polluted and neighbors would receive compensating benefits of cheap
housing or easy access to jobs. Pollution under this doctrine was usually
presumed to be an aesthetic annoyance rather than a serious health con-
cern. Nuisance plaintiffs repeatedly challenged both the presumption of
local consent to pollution exposure and the aesthetically based problem
definition.
In nuisance cases spanning the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
plaintiffs and defendants battled over the proper characterization of pol-
lution problems. Plaintiffs testified to a long list of physiological and
emotional symptoms such as headaches, sore throats, burning eyes, nau-
sea, and depression as evidence of the immediate impact of pollution on
their health.' 68 Injury to vegetation and animals was cited as further evi-
dence of potential harmful effects on humans. 169 The burden of proof
belonged to the plaintiffs, and they could rarely offer scientific evidence
sufficient to establish the requisite causal link between pollution expo-
sure and disease. Absent such proof, clean air was framed as an aesthetic
amenity, a luxury of sorts. As such, there was nothing to distinguish
variation in air quality from the host of other material inequalities sepa-
rating poor and wealthy communities. Assumption of consent, therefore,
remained a viable justification.
Versailles Borough v. McKeesport Coal & Coke Co., a Pittsburgh
County Court decision, vividly demonstrates the import of plaintiffs'
failure to meet, well into the twentieth century, evidentiary burdens re-
166 Id.
167 Huckenstine's Appeal, 70 Pa. 102, 107 (1872).
168 MORAG-LEviNE, supra note 31, 39-62, 86-102; see also id. at 124-78 (discussing the
complaints put forth in contemporary nuisance disputes involving exposure to industrial
pollution).
169 Id.
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garding the existence of injury to health from pollution. 170 At issue were
fumes and smoke from burning piles of coal-mining waste, known as
gob, a common byproduct of coal mining until the late 1950s.' 71 The
suit was brought by the city and borough in which one such mine was
located.1 72 In an effort to establish that the pollution caused injury to
health, the plaintiffs introduced fifty-one witnesses, who collectively
spoke of suffering irritated throats, hay fever, asthma, coughs and other
symptoms as a result of the fumes.173 For their part, the defendants pro-
duced seventy-one witnesses who insisted that the pollution caused them
no ill effects. 174 Measurements of potentially dangerous chemicals
showed concentrations significantly lower than those considered harmful
to health, and the plaintiffs' case was further weakened by the absence of
local doctors willing to testify to the existence of a link between the
pollution and disease. 175 The court concluded it had no evidence "to
warrant the assumption that the health of anyone is being imperiled"1 76
and proceeded to define the pertinent injury in terms of the annoyance
posed by "dust," "smoke," and "odors," an annoyance "trivial in compar-
ison to the positive harm and damage that would be done to the commu-
nity, were the injunction asked for granted."' 77
The opinion left no doubt about the relevance of the plaintiffs' deci-
sion to reside in a coal mining area to this result. As the judge explained:
The plaintiffs are subject to an annoyance. This we ac-
cept, but it is an annoyance they have freely assumed.
Because they desired and needed a residential proximity
to their places of employment, they chose to found their
abode here. It is not for them to repine; and it is proba-
ble that upon reflection they will, in spite of the annoy-
ance which they suffer, still conclude that, after all,
one's bread is more important than landscape or clear
skies. 178
Elsewhere in the opinion the judge summed up the above sentiment in
the following phrase: "[o]ne who voluntarily goes to war should not
complain about cannon smoke."' 179
170 Versailles Borough v. McKeesport Coal & Coke Co., 83 PrrrSB. LEG. J. 379, 379
(1935).
171 Id. at 379-80.
172 Id. at 379.
173 Id. at 379, 383.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 382.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 383.
178 Id. at 385.
179 Id. at 384.
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Across these and numerous other examples, courts offered plaintiffs
in industrial locales little, if any, recourse against pollution.18° In such
instances it may well be said that the common law conferred on indus-
trial sources a right to pollute, to borrow Coase's formulation. Yet the
meaning and even existence of that right depended on the absence of
clear scientific evidence regarding pollution's health effects. The claim
that the right to pollute extended beyond harm to property or comfort, to
the infliction sickness or death was not one that judges were willing to
make at least not outright.
Apparently the same can be said of Coase, since none of the four air
pollution cases mentioned in Coase's 1960 article concerned claims re-
garding health effects. The first (Cooke v. Forbes) involved fumes from
a manufacturer of sulphat ammonia that blackened cocoa-nut fibre mat-
ting produced by an adjoining company; 181 the second (Bryant v.
Lefever) involved smoke from a private dwelling; 182 the third (Bass v.
Gregory) stemmed from a dispute over the smell of a brewery; 183 and the
fourth was Adams v. Ursell, the earlier-discussed conflict over the odors
of a fried fish store. 184 Conspicuously missing from this list was litiga-
tion over large scale pollution of significant toxicological concern of the
type that was at issue in St. Helen's or Versailles Borrough. For Coase,
as in the common law, notions of reciprocal causation and attendant
rights to pollute, or otherwise inflict harm, derived their intuitive appeal
from a symmetrical construction of the competing interests at stake. This
symmetry was called into question, however, where pollution was de-
fined as a threat to life, rather than property.
The construction of pollution as a harm to property rather than
health was thus intrinsic to the right to pollute, which the common law
implicitly granted to industrial sources under the locality doctrine. Im-
portantly, this right did not depend on the lack of feasible means of pol-
lution reduction. On the contrary, the common law approach was
distinguished by the absence of an across-the-board requirement that pol-
180 See, e.g., Tuttle v. Church, 53 F. 422, 426 (C.C.R.I. Cir. 1892); Bove v. Donner-
Hanna Coke Corp. 258 N.Y.S. 229, 231-32 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932). For a much more recent
example of the impact of locale characteristics on nuisance claims, see Wells Mfg. Co v.
Pollution Control Bd., 73 Ill. 3d 337, 339-40 (1977). On the barriers that courts put before
plaintiffs who challenged pollution in industrial locales in England during the 19th century, see
Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403,
414-20 (1974).
181 Coase, supra note 35, at 10 (describing Cooke v. Forbes, (1867) 5 L.R. Eq. 166
(v.C.)).
182 Id. at 11 (describing Bryant v. Lefever, (1878) 4 C.P.D. 172).
183 Id. at 14 (describing Bass v. Gregory, (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 481).
184 Id. at 21 (describing Adams v. Ursell, (1879) il Ch.D. 865).
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lution sources at all locales invest in pollution control. 185 The burden of
proof in each instance fell to the plaintiffs to show that the injury they
suffered was sufficient to justify intervention. Absent such proof, indus-
trial sources faced no obligation to reduce their emissions, notwithstand-
ing the availability of economically and technologically feasible controls.
That was as true in the case of odors from a fish store, as it was where
the pertinent pollution was noxious fumes from smelters, chemical man-
ufacturers, or burning gob piles. As the evidence on the injury that pol-
lution posed to health accumulated, pressures for reform mounted. These
efforts promoted requirements for across-the-board implementation of
practicable means of pollution control, though with varying degrees of
success.
III. REGULATORY TRANSITIONS: TOWARDS ACROSS-THE-
BOARD POLLUTION REGULATION
The first legislative reforms directed at air quality improvement
were enacted in England in the early decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury. 186 These efforts initially focused on the abatement of coal
smoke.1 87 But in 1863, under the aforementioned Alkali Act, the Parlia-
ment passed a law restricting hydrochloric acid emissions from alkali
works, the first of a long list of noxious vapors that would in time come
under the umbrella of the Alkali Act's administrative regime.188 Passed
in response to pressure from affected land owners, the Alkali Act im-
posed a demand for 95% reduction in hydrochloric acid emissions. 18 9
Technology capable of achieving this goal at reasonable cost seemingly
had existed since the 1830s. 190 But few manufacturers put that technol-
ogy to use in the absence of legal incentives to do so under the common
law. 19' The deployment of that under-utilized pollution control technol-
ogy was the primary objective, if not the sole purpose, of the 1863 Act.
185 This is not to suggest the absence of judicial decrees requiring the implementation of
available control under nuisance law. From the mid-nineteenth century onward courts, on
occasion, found sources liable for pollution, even in industrial areas, and required the imple-
mentation of feasible means of control through injunctive relief. Where courts relied on this
strategy, they rejected the existence of a right to pollute under the circumstances. The right in
question was a right to inflict harm in the course of one's business activity, not withstanding
one's ability to avoid that harm through feasible means For a discussion of injunctions geared
at the implementation of "Best Available Technology." See MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 31, at
98-102.
186 PETER BRIMBLECOMBE, THE BIG SMOKE 101-03 (1987).
187 Id.
188 ASHBY & ANDERSON, supra note 54, at 23.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 20.
191 On some of the difficulties that plaintiffs faced in nuisance suits against Alkali works
see the absence of common law incentive. See Roy M. MacLoed, The Alkali Acts Administra-
tion, 1863-84: The Emergence of the Civil Scientist, 9 VicTORIAN STUD. 85, 89 (1965).
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Importantly, the Act granted enforcement powers to a specially created
centralized Alkali Inspectorate, rather than the courts where enforcement
authority traditionally belonged under nuisance law. 192 From this mod-
est beginning, a series of legislative amendments during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries extended the Alkali Inspectorate's
reach to the control of numerous other gasses and industrial processes. 193
At times, the pertinent legislation imposed specific emission standards on
regulated industries. 194 More commonly, the Act conferred on the In-
spectorate discretion to determine the "best practicable means" for reduc-
ing emissions. 195 Such a formula was chosen over the alternative of the
"best known method" with the goal of allowing greater regulatory flexi-
bility and attention to economic, as well as technological,
considerations.' 96
The centralization of noxious-vapor regulation within the Alkali In-
spectorate had its origins in a larger set of sanitary reforms in England
during the mid-nineteenth century. During the 1840s, Edwin Chadwick,
a public health reformer, led the efforts to shift primary responsibility for
the abatement of sanitary nuisances, such as running sewers and open
garbage, from the courts to administrative boards. 197 Where local au-
thorities failed to act, Chadwick sought to transfer responsibility to the
central government through the national board of health. 198 The Public
Health Act of 1848 marked an important move in this direction. 199 But
influential opponents disparaged the centralizing tendencies of the re-
gime that the Act sought to instate as an affront to two key English con-
stitutional principles: absolute local autonomy and regulation through
common law.2 ° The delegation of enforcement powers to continental-
styled "boards and commissions" armed with power of inspection was a
chief point of contention. 20 1 The fact that the national board of health
was dissolved by 1854 speaks to the political resonance of this line of
argument. 20 2 The Alkali Act regime that came into being less than a
192 ASHBY & ANDERSON, supra note 54, at 23.
193 Id. at 65-66, 78-81, 95-103.
194 MacLoed, supra note 191, at 107.
195 See ASHBY & ANDERSON, supra note 54, at 50.
196 Id. at 49.
197 See generally M. W. Flinn, Introduction to EDWIN CHADWICK, REPORT ON THE SANI-
TARY CONDITION OF THE LABOURING POPULATION OF GREAT BRITAIN 52, 71 (M.W. Flinn ed.,
1964).
198 See id. at 66-73; JOSEF REDLICH, 1 LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND 138 (1903).
199 The Act established a national board of health with limited supervisory authority over
the local boards in whose hands the Act placed primary enforcement powers. REDLICH, supra
note 195, at 140-44.
200 Id. at 145.
201 J. ToULMIN SMITH, LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT AND CENTRALIZATION 126 (1851).
202 REDLICH, supra note 198, at 147.
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decade later likewise faced the challenge of reconciling its centralizing
regulatory mission with English localist traditions.2 03
For decades, the leaders of the Alkali Inspectorate battled to expand
their jurisdiction against the defenders of local regulation.204 The In-
spectorate's greatest defeat in this respect was its failure to bring coal
smoke under its control. 20 5 Well into the twentieth century, the result
was a dual regulatory regime where air pollution was concerned. Many
gases and processes were subject to regulation under the Alkali Act. But
smoke was subject to local, and generally weak, controls.20 6 The Alkali
Act's own enforcement policies themselves acquired, in time, a degree of
localist sensibility. The Chief Alkali Inspector in 1871 wrote:
[ ]It would be very unfair[] . . . [ ]to make a general law
fixing the meaning of a nuisance to be the same in all
conditions. Why should a manufacturer established in a
desert part of the country be treated like one in a
crowded thoroughfare? Or when no one complains, or,
rather, when no one is hurt, why should the mere formal-
ity of keeping a law be observed?[ ]207
Under this principle, the Inspectorate came to eschew uniform con-
trol requirements in favor of policies that tailored required reductions to
the sources' environmental impact.20 8 The approach bore resemblance to
the common law's locality doctrine even if it did not allow for explicit
consideration of socio-demographic factors in the same fashion that the
common law did.20 9
English ambivalence over the central government's proper role in
the regulation of pollution at the end of the nineteenth century accorded
with larger political debates on the constitutionality of governmental in-
terference in market ordering. The common law, on one side in this ar-
gument, defined the limits of state authority to intervene in economic
relations. Into this debate Pigou's conceptualization of the conditions
necessitating governmental intervention introduced a transformative line
of argument. Contrary to the assumptions of classical economists, Pigou
argued, state interference "with normal economic processes may be ex-
pected, not to diminish, but to increase the dividend" under certain con-
203 ASHBY & ANDERSON, supra note 54, at 42.
204 See id. at 44-53.
205 See id. at 54-64.
206 Id. at 54-64, 92-103. It was only after the 1952 London Smog episode that Parliament
began to regulate coal smoke in earnest. See id. at 104-19.
207 Annual Report of the Alkali Inspectorate for 1871, at 5 (1872), cited in ASHBY &
ANDERSON, supra note 54, at 51.
208 ASHBY & ANDERSON, supra note 54, at 51-52.
209 Id. at 51.
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ditions. 210 Divergence between private and net product-private and
social cost in contemporary terminology-led to situations where gov-
ernment action could improve upon the performance of the unfettered
market. Ordinarily, producers' self-interest led them to restrict industrial
production to the level at which marginal costs equaled marginal benefit.
This tendency was absent where marginal social cost exceeded marginal
private cost, and too much of the good (and too much harm) would be
produced. Pigou offered smoke among a list of examples of the type of
situations in which social and private net products will tend to diverge.
"[S]moke in large towns," Pigou wrote, "inflicts a heavy uncharged
loss on the community, in injury to buildings and vegetables, expenses
for washing clothes and cleaning rooms, expenses for the provision of
extra artificial light, and in many other ways. '211 Furthermore, Pigou
suggested that, "mere ignorance and enertia [sic]," rather than the ab-
sence of feasible means of smoke control, were to blame for the smoke's
persistence because, "[t]here seems no doubt that, by means of mechani-
cal stokers, hot-air blasts and other arrangements, factory chimneys can
be made practically smokeless. '212 Factory owners have little interest in
implementing these mechanisms since the benefits from doing so would
accrue to others, rather than themselves. Pigou noted in passing, but
with seeming approval, that "[n]oxious fumes from alkali works are sup-
pressed by the law more vigorously than smoke. '213 The smoke problem
was of marginal interest to Pigou, who devoted a total of one paragraph
to it in The Economics of Welfare.214 That, however, sufficed to provide
advocates of across-the-board pollution regulation with a powerful eco-
nomic rationale.
Public concern with air pollution increased in the post-World War II
era both in England and the United States. Two severe air pollution epi-
sodes contributed to the political salience of air quality problems in both
countries: the first took place in Donora, Pennsylvania in 1948, and the
second was the London "killer fog." 21 5 Increased mortality and illnesses
in the wake of these episodes offered proof, to those who still needed it,
that air pollution endangered health. In 1955, Congress took the first
step towards federal regulation of air pollution in the Air Pollution Con-
210 A.C. PiGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172 (4th ed. 1962).
211 See id. at 184 (construing J.W. GRAHAM, THE DEsTRuCTION OF DAYLIGHT (1907)).
212 Id. at 184 n.3.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 184.
215 The 1952 London fog was said to have resulted in 4,000 deaths. A U.S. Public Health
Service Survey put the Donora episode's toll on life and health at twenty deaths and approxi-
mately three thousand severely and moderately affected individuals. CHARLES 0. JONES,
CLEAN AIR: THE POLICIES AND POLITICS OF POLLUTION CONTROL 27 (1975).
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trol Act.2 16 By the end of the 1960s, the environmental movement would
drastically expand the state's regulatory authority across the Western
world. In England and the United States, this transformation cut against
the decentralized and reactive presuppositions of a centuries-old common
law regime. For opponents of the rapidly expanding administrative state,
Coase's The Problem of Social Cost would become a foundational
document.
IV. THE RIGHT TO POLLUTE AND THE PROBLEM
OF HOTSPOTS
The idea of tradable pollution rights was conceived during a time of
growing political pressure for the enactment of comprehensive federal
environmental legislation in the United States. In works published dur-
ing the late 1960s, two economists, independently of each other,
presented variants of market-based alternatives to direct regulation. In a
1966 article, Thomas D. Crocker envisioned a system whereby an air
pollution control authority supplies emission rights that can then be
bought and traded among emitters and receptors of pollution. 217 Two
years later, J. H. Dales drafted the outline of a market for water pollution
rights in a book titled Pollution, Property and Prices.218 Dales specifi-
cally acknowledged Coase's influence, 219 however, Crocker's line of
reasoning resonated more closely with Coase's.
Similarly to Coase, Crocker insisted that the economic interests of
both emitters and receptors of pollution must be taken into account in the
formulation of pollution control policy. 220 This was because it was a
mistake to view air solely in reference to its life- and property-sustaining
capacity, as "pure-air advocates" tended to do.2 2 1 What these advocates
failed to recognize was that air also served a waste disposal capacity.
Policies that allowed polluters to dispose waste into the air free of charge
yielded less pollution control than would be economically desirable. Si-
multaneously, Crocker argued that policies that treated clean air as a free
good would lead to excessive levels of pollution control. 222 Crocker
stated that the solution was to be found in a regulatory method that
216 See Air Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 84-159, § 1, 69 Stat. 322, 322 (2000).
217 Thomas D. Crocker, The Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems, in
THE ECONOMICS OF AIR POLLUTION 61, 80-84 (Harold Wolozin ed., 1966).
218 J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES, 105 (1968).
219 Id. at I11.
220 Crocker, supra note 217, at 62-63 ("We are no more justified in making the would-be
emitter endure all the costs of 'pure' air while the would-be receptor receives all the benefits
than we are in burdening the receptor with all the costs of 'dirty' air while the emitter collects
all the benefits.").
221 Id. at 62.
222 See id.
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would "cause the relative value of each dimension to be reflected in the
joint production decisions of receptors and emitters. '223 Toward this
end, he proposed the use of tradable pollution rights as an alternative to
fixed standards. 224 Under this system, emission rights (defined in refer-
ence to amount, rate, location, and meteorological conditions) would be
made available for purchase to both emitters and receptors on a competi-
tive basis.225 Although individual receptors would lack incentive to pay
for clean air that they could not exclude others from enjoying, this col-
lective-action problem could be overcome through the organization of
groups of receptors that are large enough to appropriate the benefits from
purchases of emission rights. 226 Crocker assigned the task of delineating
the geographical boundaries encompassing discrete receptor groups as
well as overseeing cost-sharing arrangements to air pollution control
agencies but left the details of such a program to be determined at a later
date. 227
Crocker's scheme implicitly endorsed the existence, and perhaps
even the desirability, of local variation in levels of pollution control.
Since the price of pollution rights is a function in part of the amount that
receptors would be willing to pay for such rights, these rights in poorer
areas would likely fetch a lower price than in wealthier locales. As a
consequence, polluters would be more inclined to control pollution in
affluent areas (rather than buy rights), or to relocate. Crocker high-
lighted the potential of pollution markets to optimize "interspatial alloca-
tion of the air's two value dimensions," but did not address any attendant
equity concerns. 228 In aiming at interspatial differentiation in levels of
pollution, Crocker's model accorded with a key feature of the common
law's locality doctrine. Rather than judges and juries, however, it was
the "individual preference functions of receptors and emitters" that were
expected to determine the spatial allocation of pollution under Crocker's
version of tradable rights. 229
Dales's model of pollution markets differed from that of Crocker in
one key respect. Crocker looked to pollution markets to determine the
optimal amount of atmospheric pollution. Dales, by contrast, left the de-
termination of relevant environmental goals to political and administra-
tive bodies. The purpose of pollution markets for Dales was not to set
the ends of environmental policy, but to allow for efficient implementa-
223 Id. at 66.
224 Id. at 79.
225 See id. at 81.
226 See id. at 84.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
229 Id. at 80.
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tion of the policy decided upon.230  Consequently, under his model,
Dales assigned the task of determining applicable environmental quality
levels to governing administrative bodies.2 31 Within this framework,
pollution rights serve to reduce the costs of compliance with this goal,
rather than determine levels of pollution. The benefit such a system of
pollution rights confers in this context is the flexibility it accords regu-
lated sources. Whereas some firms would find it profitable to treat their
wastes, others might opt to purchase rights instead. The total amount of
pollution, however, would be the same as that which across-the-board
regulation would have produced. Nevertheless, what would vary is the
concentration of pollutants in the immediate vicinity of sources that con-
trolled their effluents or purchased rights. Dales did not address the po-
tential contribution of pollution markets to such intra-regional variation.
Elsewhere, however, he made clear that intra-regional variation in levels
of pollution is often a proper policy objective to be preferred over that of
uniform environmental quality standards. 232
Dales relied in this connection on Ezra J. Mishan, a prominent econ-
omist, who argued in a 1967 book in favor of a "separate facilities" ap-
proach to environmental problems.2 33 Offering the separation of
smokers from non-smokers on train cars as an example, Mishan argued
for the superiority of policies that allow for diverse environmental condi-
tions across locales over policies that aim to achieve uniform levels of
environmental quality. 234 Adopting this principle, Dales argued that in
some instances it may be practicable for policy to aim at the provision of
"different air and water qualities in different regions."2 35 The benefits of
this approach lay in its capacity to designate different areas for different
uses, such as industrial production and recreation. "[T]here is no neces-
sity for the quality of water at Belleville to be the same as the quality of
water along the Toronto beaches. There is every reason, it seems to me,
to try to keep it different. '2 36 One way of securing this type of policy
outcome, Dales stated, was through a differential assignment of property
230 Dales was highly skeptical of the capacity of individuals to properly value the injury
suffered from different amounts of pollution. He offered this skepticism in reference to the
capacity of cost benefit analysis methods to determine optimum pollution levels. See DALES,
supra note 218, at 42-43. But the discussion suggests that he would have been similarly
dubious of reliance on market exchanges to determine air, or water, quality goals. See id. By
contrast Dales considered economic analysis highly useful in deciding "on the best way of
implementing a policy once it has been chosen. The criterion is simply that the best way of
implementing a policy is the least costly way, counting all costs." Id. at 99.
231 See id. at 77, 93.
232 Id. at 72.
233 Dales relates Mishan's example of the separation of trains into smoking and non-
smoking cars as a solution to differing preferences among passengers. See id.
234 See EZRA MISun',, THE COSTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 80-86 (1967).
235 DALES, supra note 218, at 72.
236 Id. at 91.
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rights. Under that approach, "[i]nstead of giving property rights in water
use to polluters or fishermen, it may be thought desirable to assign the
rights to fishermen in one area and to polluters in another. '237 In this
argument, more than anywhere else in Dales's book, Coase's influence
seems evident.238
The principle that Dales, following Mishan, termed "separate facili-
ties," 239 was essentially identical to that which the common law pursued
under the locality doctrine. Within that context, uncertainty regarding
health effects served to justify non-abatement of pollution where judges
deemed it to be consistent with the standards of a particular locale.240
Similarly, Dales highlighted the absence of conclusive evidence that pol-
lution injured health. As he wrote in this connection:
The health danger resulting from water pollution is mini-
mal, in my opinion. The existing technology of water
treatment seems adequate to provide good-quality drink-
ing water from the most polluted of natural waters, and
the prohibition of swimming in polluted areas reduces
the public health hazard of water-borne disease to small
proportions. 241
Regarding the danger from air pollution, however, Dales showed signifi-
cant ambivalence. Acknowledging that "[tihere can be little doubt that
some types of pollutants, in certain concentrations, are detrimental to
health," Dales went on to state that, "[t]he human respiratory system
seems able to cope satisfactorily with a great deal of air pollution, and
recent studies suggest that it is mainly when the system is burdened with
both pollution and smoking that a high risk situation is created. '242 Ulti-
mately, Dales concluded that, "[t]he only wholly tenable argument
against pollution at the present time is the aesthetic one. ' 243 Overall,
Dales was vague on the significance of the distinction between health
237 Id. at 73.
238 Coase suggested that courts take the economic consequences of their decisions into
account "[e]ven when it is possible to change the legal delimitation of rights through market
transactions." Coase, supra note 35, at 19. He then went on to argue that courts in fact have
tended to recognize "the economic implications of their decisions" and offered the locality
doctrine as a prime example. Id. at 19. Dales included Coase in a fist of three authors whose
work on property rights "may yet serve to promote a creative fusion of economics, law, and
political science" (the other authors he referenced in this connection were H.S. Gordon and
Charles A. Reich). DALES, supra note 218, at 110-11. Dales acknowledged the influence of
these three authors on this thinking on the interface between pollution and property and the
concept of property rights, but was not more specific regarding the nature of Coase's influ-
ence. Id.
239 DALES, supra note 218, at 72.
240 See discussion infra Part HI.
241 DALES, supra note 218, at 102.
242 Id. at 102-03.
243 Id. at 103.
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and aesthetics and did not directly link it with the concepts of "separate
facilities" or pollution rights. 244 It is instructive, however, that in illus-
trating the type of pollution problems best suited for the "separate facili-
ties" approach, Dales restricted his examples to ones that pertained to
water pollution.245 In similar fashion, he selected water-rather than
air-to introduce the concept of transferable rights to pollute.246 Finally,
the affinity between aesthetic constructions of pollution and separate fa-
cilities approaches of the type Dales endorsed may help explain why he
chose to treat the causal link between pollution and disease as an open
question even as late as 1968.
Within two years the 1970 Clean Air Act advanced a clear-cut man-
date for national air quality standards protective of public health.247 The
law conferred a seemingly absolute right to clean air and was incompati-
ble with the type of pollution hotspots implicit to the separate facilities
approach.248 Rights to pollute could find a place in this regime only to
the extent that their distributive impact could be neutralized. In a 1972
article, David Montgomery took up this challenge. 249 Montgomery's
proposed solution substituted tradable "pollution licenses" for "emission
licenses. '250 The difference between the two types of permits is that
emission licenses lack sensitivity to the problem of local concentrations,
while pollution licenses are calculated in reference to a specified air
quality standard to be monitored at various points across an air quality
region.25 1 Using sulfur oxide emissions as an example, Montgomery
claimed to establish "the possibility of achieving environmental goals at
a number of geographic points while maintaining the advantages of a
market system. ' 252 He concluded that "one important objection to the
use of economic incentives, that they could lead to change in the pattern
of emissions such that although air quality improvements at one point are
achieved, it is at the expense of deteriorating air quality elsewhere, is laid
to rest."
253
244 Dales introduced the paragraphs dealing with available evidence regarding health ef-
fects with the statement linking "[t]he emotional heat generated by popular discussion of pol-
lution" to the suspicion that pollution threatened health. Id. at 102.
245 See id. at 73, 91.
246 See id. at 77-84.
247 See David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air
Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740, 743, 746 (1983).
248 Id. at 743.
249 W. David Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Pro-
grams, 5 J. EcoN. THEORY 395, 396 (1972).
250 Id.
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252 Id. at 410.
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Montgomery's optimistic assessment proved less sound in practice
than in theory. Notwithstanding various attempts to build upon and re-
fine the ambient permit model that he posited as a solution to the hotspot
problem, "no single operating air pollution emissions-trading program"
had followed that model by 2006.254 The difficulty stems from the re-
stricted opportunities for trade and added transaction costs that are inte-
gral to the imposition of a layer of spatial limitations upon pollution
markets. As a result of these concerns, Congress rejected proposals to
incorporate geographical restrictions into the SO 2 cap-and-trade program
it instituted under the 1990 Clean Air Act.255 In similar fashion, the
South Coast Air Quality Management District (the regional agency in
charge of regulating air quality in the Los Angeles Basin) did not restrict
the location of nitrogen oxide and sulfur oxide trades in pollution rights
under the Regional Clean Air Incentive Market (RECLAIM) program
instituted in 1992.256 The current controversy over mercury trades simi-
larly attests to the intractability of the conflict between pollution rights
and the desirability of reducing emissions everywhere.
CONCLUSION
The goal of reducing pollution everywhere should not be confused
with the goal of equalizing the levels of pollution across all locales. Ge-
ographical variation in environmental quality is an unavoidable product
of concentrations of economic activity, irrespective of the choice of regu-
latory instrument. The policy question at hand is not whether variations
in environmental quality are desirable; they are. Instead, the question is
whether a pollution regime should aim at variations in environmental
control. Should residents in more industrial areas or in areas where pol-
lution is more expensive to clean up, nonetheless benefit from the incre-
mental reductions that available technology can offer? Or alternatively,
should law and policy accept uncontrolled pollution in some areas in
exchange for compensating reductions elsewhere?
Technology standards' answer to these questions are that feasible
reductions in levels of pollution across all sources-with the benefits that
mitigation confers on neighbors of industrial concentrations-is desira-
ble. As their critics have often noted, the result can be both overregula-
tion (where mitigation exceeds what would be necessary to protect public
health) and insufficient regulation (where the standards are insufficient to
protect against health effects). 257 In the latter case, technology standards
254 TIETENBERG, supra note 11, at 75.
255 Nash & Revesz, supra note 21, at 587.
256 Drury et al., supra note 12, at 256.
257 Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1, 97 (1995).
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may well leave in place dangerous levels of localized pollution. 258 How-
ever, this pollution would be residual to the implementation of feasible
pollution controls, not the result of a license to avoid the implementation
of feasible mitigation in the first place. Pollution markets grant just such
a license because they are capable of leaving some concentrations en-
tirely uncontrolled, an outcome impossible by definition under uniform
standards.
The common law's locality doctrine often denied those living in
industrial sources the incremental improvement that available pollution
control technology would have yielded. The perceived deficiencies of
that system propelled the emergence of centralized administrative re-
gimes and the attendant deployment of technology standards. In turn,
critics pushed for market-based alternatives to regulatory demands for
pollution reduction across all sources. Under one version, pollution mar-
kets are the innovation of late twentieth-century economists, reacting to
an overly rigid environmental regime. The history described here sug-
gests a longer pedigree. Over several centuries, English and American
pollution control policy was characterized by a back-and-forth swing be-
tween two regulatory paradigms: one tolerant of variations in levels of
control as it geared at regulation tailored to the circumstances of differ-
ing pollution sources and locales; and the other committed to feasible
mitigation of pollution across all sources.
Uncertainty regarding the health effects of air pollution helped to
legitimize the common law's locality-based distinctions. As the evi-
dence regarding the existence of such health effects mounted, the coun-
tervailing paradigm gained ground. Pigovian constructions of
unregulated pollution as a market failure reinforced this trend. In re-
sponse, Coase disputed the existence of an efficiency-based rationale for
the internalization of pollution and other social costs-invoking the com-
mon law in support.
He offered no guidance, besides reciprocal causation, on the ethical
dilemmas at stake. The imperative of addressing objections to pollution
markets based in local pollution effects was recognized by these markets'
advocates from the start. Tracing emissions trading to its common law
roots underscores the tradeoffs that this policy approach entails. The
question on the table today-as it was during the nineteenth century-
revolves around the benefits and drawbacks of regulatory regimes that
insist that neighbors of pollution sources across all facilities and locales
benefit from the deployment of feasible means of mitigation.
258 In such instances additional, risk-based standards may impose further pollution abate-
ment measures beyond those that applicable technology standards would dictate.
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